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Abstract
A fundamental problem in conflict studies is how to explain the root causes of terrorism. This study 
suggests that terrorism thrives in specific regions with high growth rates of population that may 
generate income inequality and relative deprivation of people. In addition, geospatial analysis here 
reveals that countries with high association between fatalities for terrorist incidents and population 
growth are mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Middle East, East and South Asia. Overall, 
then, one of the causes of terrorism is due to sociodemographic factors combined with psychosocial 
risk factors.
Keywords: Terrorism; Population Growth; Demographic Factors; Income Inequality; Poverty; 
Relative Deprivation, Psychosocial risk factors. 
Overview of the problem   
This paper has two goals. The first is to analyse the possible association between demographic 
factors and effects of terrorist attacks. The second is to suggest that terrorism thrives in the 
presence of high growth rates of population, which can support socioeconomic and psychosocial 
risk factors. These topics are basic in modern society because terrorism is growing both in rich and 
developing nations (Newman, 2006; Reardon, 2015). Many studies endeavour to clarify the direct 
and indirect determinants of terrorism (Abadie, 2005; Crenshaw, 1981; Newman, 2006; Freytag et 
al., 2011; McAllister and Schmid, 2011), though predictors of terrorism are often unclear factors in 
different societies (Krueger and Malečková, 2009). Some sources of terrorism are economic factors 
(Blomberg et al., 2004; Krueger and Malečková, 2003), political factors (Coggins, 2015), social 
factors (Krueger and Malečková, 2003), etc. However, whether and how demographic factors cause 
and sustain terrorism are hardly known. The study here confronts this scientific problem trying to 
analyse and explain whenever possible, the role of demographic factors associated with effects of 
terrorist incidents. 
Theoretical framework and working hypothesis 
The UN General Assembly claimed that terrorism can be due to socioeconomic issues of poverty, 
inequality, underdevelopment and the absence of social justice in some regions (United Nations, 
2016). A popular hypothesis in these research fields is that terrorism and other forms of political 
violence are due to poverty and poor distribution of economic resources (Piazza, 2006; Piazza 
and Von Hippel, 2014). This “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis” explains terrorism as “expression 
of socioeconomic discontent and desperation” (Piazza, 2006, p. 160). In particular, terrorist 
organizations can use poor socioeconomic conditions as a base to foster their criminal activities (cf., 
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Blomberg et al., 2004; Enders and Hoover, 2012; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). In fact, low levels 
of socioeconomic development increase the appeal of political extremism, encourage political 
violence and instability in society (Piazza, 2006). Piazza (2006, p. 463) also argues that unlike popular 
opinion, “no significant relationship between any of the measures of economic development 
and terrorism can be determined. Rather, variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, 
increased state repression and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be 
significant predictors of terrorism”. The study of these variables, such as demographic factors, is 
basic for understanding the sources and effects of terrorism in society. In general, scholars show that 
population growth can support resource scarcity and violence in countries (Christens and Speer, 
2005; Lee, 2016). The theoretical background of these studies is the theory of Malthus (1817) that 
argues geometric growth rates for population, while food resources have arithmetic growth rates. 
The dissimilar rates of growth between population and subsistence food tend to decrease natural 
resources and generate a looming crisis and environmental conflicts. Many scholars are current 
proponents of neo-Malthusian approaches to explain economic and social issues, such as Ehrlich 
(1968) that foretold a coming crisis from overpopulation and limited resources (cf., Meadows et al., 
2004). Linstone (2003, p. 288) argued that: “The world population is expected to increase from 6.2 
billion to 9.3 billion in 2050 and 98% of this growth will be in the poorer countries” (cf., Rapoport, 
2004). Ehrlich and Liu (2002, p. 188) observed that: 
high population growth rates are expected to continue in many developing nations, with 
a projected annual growth rate for people aged 20–34 of 2.82% as opposed to a rate of 
0.16% in developed countries during the years 2000–2050 … In the face of such growth, 
job opportunities may be doomed to become much rarer.
In this context, Kaplan (2000) argued a possible threat to developed countries can be due to 
population increase of poor countries. Visaria (1989, p. 7) argues that one of the most serious 
consequences of the acceleration in population growth is the difficulty of generating adequate 
employment opportunities for the growing labour force of countries. Cassils (2004) claims that the 
poorest regions of the world, where population growth is still rapid, will continue to suffer with 
a decreased life expectancy because of resource depletion, conflicts and diseases. In general, 
the mismanagement of this equilibrium between population and natural–economic resources in 
specific regions can cause problems of violent crime and conflicts (Peluso and Watts, 2001). Krieger 
and Meierrieks (2010, p. 914) claim that: “Terrorism is also positively linked to larger populations, 
but this may simply indicate that terrorism is more likely in more populous countries”. Cassils (2004) 
suggests that population growth can contribute to the overexploitation of resources and space, 
reducing the freedoms of individuals mainly in poor and unstable regions of the globe, and possibly 
give rise to more violence and terrorism. In particular, the interconnections between overpopulation 
and low economic growth of specific areas are a critical factor of growing insecurity worldwide 
(Cassils, 2004, p. 172). However, whether and how population growth influences terrorism is hardly 
known. The studies discussed above suggest a critical relation between population growth and 
terrorism that can lay theoretical foundations to explore a hypothesis of general causes of terrorism 
driven by population growth.
Suppose that terrorism is a specific and distinct type of violent crime. This crime, in general, is due 
to some group organized that has technical skills to carry out a terrorist action directed to challenge 
a nation’s authority and induce fear and anxiety into civilian population (cf., Crenshaw, 1981, p. 
380). Rice (2009, p. 253) argues that: “similarities between terrorism and crime are … evident”, 
then the psychosocial research of crime is well positioned to frame environmental risk factors that 
can support terrorism’s psychological space (cf., LaFree and Dugan, 2009).
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The working hypothesis of the study here is:
• Hypothesis of terrorism driven by population growth: The effectiveness of terrorism is 
positively affected by high growth rates of population over time and space, ceteris paribus.
The purpose of the present study is to see whether statistical evidence supports the hypothesis 
that fatalities from terrorist attacks are associated with high growth rates of population between 
countries.
Materials and methods
The study here analyses whether under the condition of high growth rate of population, confirmed 
fatalities for the incident from terrorist attacks increase, even when controlling other factors.
1.1 Sample and sources
The sample of this study is based on N=132 countries. Source of data is Democracy Cross-National 
Data by Norris (2015), World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008) and Global Terrorism 
Database (START, 2015).
1.2 Measures
The measures of terrorism effectiveness, growth rates of population and other socioeconomic 
indicators are as follows.
GTD defines terrorist attacks (Global Terrorism Database codebook, 2015, p. 8): “the threatened 
or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. Effects of terrorist attacks in society 
are measured by the number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident for 2002-2014 period. 
This number includes all victims and attackers who died as a direct result of the incident (Global 
Terrorism Database, START, 2015).
• Annual population growth rate, 1975-2002 and 2002-2015 period, is the exponential rate of 
growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage. Source of data 
is Norris (2015). 
• Freedom House standardized scale 100 pts 2000 measures democratization. Source of data 
is Norris (2015). 
• Kaufmann political stability 2000. It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Source of data is Norris (2015). 
• Ethnic fractionalization index -combined linguistic and racial- (Alesina et al., 2003). Source 
of data is also Norris (2015). 
• Human development index (HDI) 2005 (Norris, 2015).
• Gross Domestic Product per capita US$ 2002 –GDPPC. Source of data is the World Bank 
(2008) and Norris (2015).
• Income Gini coefficient 2004 is a measure of the deviation of the distribution of income 
among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. Source 
of data is also the World Bank (2013) and Norris (2015).
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1.3 Research Design and Data Analysis Procedure
The approach here performs a country-level analysis worldwide (N=132 countries). Statistical 
analyses apply the Statistics Software SPSS®version 24. Skewed variables are ln-transformed 
before including in statistical analyses. Statistical techniques to support the hypothesis of previous 
section are:
• Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation and partial correlation (with control variables Gini 
coefficient of income inequality). 
• Regression analysis with linear models. The specification of the model of simple regression 
is:
LnY i,t = l0 + l1 Ln xi,t + ui,t [1]
country i=1, …, N;       t=time   
where:
• Yi,t = Number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident from terrorist attacks over 2002-
2014 (dependent variable)
• xi,t = Annual population growth rate 1975-2002 (explanatory variable) 
• ui,t = Error term 
The model [1] is estimated with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method.
This study also calculates arithmetic mean and standard deviation between the following 
geoeconomic regions based on Regional categories of the dataset by Norris (2015): North America, 
Central America & Caribbean, South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Australasia 
& Oceania. In particular, this classification is used to analyse and compare demographic and 
socioeconomic factors underlying effectiveness of terrorist attacks between these geoeconomic 
regions of the globe.
• Geospatial analysis of the association between lethality of terrorism and population growth 
The association between annual population growth and number of confirmed fatalities for terrorist 
incidents of country i (ASCTi) is given by:
ASCTi= annual population growth rate (1975-2002)i×number of confirmed fatalities for 
terrorist incidents over (2002-2014)i    (i=country, with i=1, 2, ..., N)  [2]
The sample of this analysis is based on N=132 countries. Countries i are divided in four categories:
1. low association:  ASCTi ≤ 25th percentile  
2. moderate association: 25th percentile < ASCTi ≤ 50th percentile 
3. high association: 50th percentile < ASCTi ≤ 75th percentile
4. very high association: ASCTi > 75th percentile
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A geographic map of the globe visualizes each country according to the category to which it 
belongs. 
Results
• Statistical evidence with correlation and regression analyses
The bivariate correlation shows a coefficient of Pearson correlation r=.40 (p-value< .001), which 
indicates a positive linear relationship between levels of annual population growth rate and number 
of confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents. The partial correlation, controlling income inequality, 
also reveals a positive relationship between these variables (r= .30, p-value< .01). These results 
are consistent with the hypothesis stated above about the positive association between annual 
population growth and confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents (Table 1).
Table 1. Correlation between LN number of confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents over (2002-
2014) and LN annual population growth rate (1975-2002)
Bivariate correlation r .40
p-value .001
Partial correlation .30
p-value .009
Control variable: Income Gini coefficient 2002y
The OLS estimation of the model [1] in table 2 indicates that a 1% higher level of annual population 
growth rate, increases the expected number of confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents by about 
0.62% (p-value<.001).  
Table 2. Regressions of confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents on annual population growth rate
Dependent variable: 
LN number of confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents over 2002-
2014
Explanatory variable: 
LN annual population growth rate 1975-2002
Constant l0 -0.15
(St. Err.) (0.14)
Coefficient l1 0.62***
(St. Err.) (0.14)
R2 adj. 0.15
(St. Err. of the Estimate) (1.35)
F 20.77
(Sign). (0.001)
Note: ***= p-value < .001; other variables, such as wealth of nations, 
income inequality, etc., have not been added in the model 
of regression here because either they are not significant 
(e.g., LN Income Gini coefficient 2004 has p-value = .939) 
or national wealth and Human development Index, etc. are, 
together with demographic factors, already represented by 
annual population growth rate between countries.
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• Geospatial analysis of the association between terrorism and population growth 
The spatial distribution of the association between annual population growth rate and number of 
confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents is in figure 1, whereas figure 2 shows the association under 
study between geoeconomic regions of the globe. The geospatial analysis here reveals that high 
levels of growth rates of population are associated with high number of confirmed fatalities for the 
terrorist incident in some regions of the globe, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North 
Africa, East and South Asia. However, an exception is the high association in the USA that may be 
due to different factors, such as the US foreign policy for the Middle East and other regions, US 
deterrence policy and preventive actions against non-state organizations of terrorism, US military 
actions, etc. These factors may nourish revenges of terrorist cells and individuals with deteriorated 
behaviour- at domestic, transnational and international level - that attack the civilian population in 
order to induce fear and anxiety in advanced society.
Figure 1. Global association between annual population growth rate 1975-2002 and number of 
confirmed fatalities for terrorist incidents over 2002-2014 between countries. Note: colour grey 
indicates missing values.        
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Figure 2. Association between annual population growth rate 1975-2002 and number of confirmed 
fatalities for terrorist incidents over 2002-2014 between geoeconomic regions of the globe. 
Table 3 shows the arithmetic mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) of socioeconomic variables under 
study between geoeconomic regions. Results confirm previous statistical analyses. In this context, 
Ackoff and Rovin (2003, p. 146) claim that inequality of the distribution of wealth, low opportunities 
for economic development and law quality of life contribute to “the frustration and alienation that 
give rise to terrorism” (cf. Ezcurra and Palacios, 2016). A study for the Heritage Foundation in 2002 
also argues that countries prone to terrorism are the least advantaged economically (Ackoff and 
Rovin, 2003, p. 146).  
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Discussion 
The statistical evidence reveals that, in average, regions with a high incidence of fatalities for 
terrorist incidents have also high growth rates of population. The positive correlation between 
population growth and terrorism found here can be explained with the theory of association 
between population density and poverty (cf., Curtis, 1975). Sociological studies also consider the 
perspective that high density of population produces deteriorated human functioning, which leads 
to violent crime (Thiessen and Rodgers, 1961). Other studies reveal that frustration generated 
by high levels of (population) density can stimulate violent behaviour and aggression between 
individuals (Regoeczi, 2003).
In addition, high growth rates of population modify the structure of population, increasing younger 
age categories (cf., Ehrlich and Liu, 2002). Younger populations in the presence of poverty in 
socioeconomic systems can be unable to achieve valuated goals: the “blockage of goal-seeking 
behavior” (Agnew, 1985) is a source of frustration in society. Ehrlich and Liu (2002, p. 187) confirm 
that the vast majority of terrorists were young adult males: “Based on the information from the 
FBI’s most wanted terrorist list. . . approximately 90% of those on the list were all males and from 
22 to 34 years old when their first alleged terrorist act took place” (cf., Crenshaw, 1981, p. 384). 
Another possible effect of high growth rates of population is higher economic inequality in society 
(cf., Coccia, 2017; see also Tab. 3 here). The relationship between high growth rate of population, 
income inequality and terrorism can be explained with the sociological theory of “relative 
deprivation”: inequality breeds social tensions and the less well-off individuals feel dispossessed 
when compared with wealthier people (Stack, 1984). Hsieh and Pugh (1993) argue that poverty and 
income inequality are an indicator of resource deprivation, which is associated with violent crime. 
Arthur (1991) finds in criminology that homicides can be explained with an individual’s reaction to 
resource deprivation or material disadvantage that causes personal frustration and diffuse hostility 
(cf., Nettler, 1984, p. 229). Stolzenberg, Eitle and D’Alessio (2006) confirm that violence is based 
on economic deprivation that acts as a motivational factor in the manifestation of crime. Overall, 
economic inequality of countries, also driven by high growth rates of population, combined with 
poor economic resources in society, engenders resentment, hostility, frustration, which can be 
precipitating factors of terrorism and violence (cf., Blau & Blau, 1982). Messner and Golden (1992) 
claim that: “ ‘relative deprivation’ . . . . and that the inability of the disadvantaged to get a fair 
redistribution of resources, or more open access to wealth, generates anger and frustration, which 
ultimately leads to more crime” (as quoted by Stolzenberg et al., 2006, p. 304, original emphasis). 
As a matter of fact, high levels of population growth, in the presence of income inequality, induce 
feeling of disadvantage and unfairness that leads poor people to seek compensation and satisfaction 
by all means, including committing crimes against other individuals in society (Fajnzylber et al., 
2002, p. 2). According to Gilligan (2001), income inequality affects personality of people and 
generates disrespect and humiliation, which are amongst the most common triggers to violence 
and possibly to terrorism. In short, economic inequality and high population growth can generate 
negative social interactions, resource deprivation and low sense of control over one’s life (Elgar & 
Aitken, 2010). These psychosocial risk factors may support terrorism in society.
Concluding observations
Terrorism and crime are alike (Rice, 2009) and are affected by demographic, socioeconomic and 
environmental features of particular locations (Cozens, 2008, p. 431). On the basis of the argument 
presented in this paper, we can therefore conclude that –in average- terrorism is also correlated 
to high growth rates of population, combined with poverty, high income inequality and political 
instability of countries, ceteris paribus. This theory here suggests main predictions: societies with low 
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growth rates of population, low income inequality, low relative deprivation, high standard of living 
and quality of life of young generations are not likely to produce a high effectiveness of terrorism. 
This study also predicts that current trend of high growth rates of population, associated with high 
income inequality and political instability in some societies (and communities) can continue to feed 
terrorism and terroristic threat for many years to come.
The results here can support fruitful insights for a policy of conflict resolution that ameliorates 
socioeconomic conditions of population, and indirectly reduces terrorism, such as programs of 
economic aid directed to eliminate income inequality and improve the standard of living and 
opportunities of young people in society (cf. Ackoff and Rovin, 2003; Ehrlich and Liu, 2002; Frey 
et al., 2003). The aim is to provide education and economic opportunity for young population 
to contrast the anti-modernization advocated by fundamentalists in society (cf., Krieger and 
Meierrieks, 2010, 2011). In particular, the rising economic prosperity of certain regions may help to 
lower high growth rates of population, which may be the distal causes of terrorism in society. In fact, 
Krieger and Meierrieks (2010, p. 902) confirm that social policies ameliorate short-run and long-
run socioeconomic conditions of population (e.g., reduction of unemployment, poverty, inequality, 
and dissatisfaction), and indirectly can reduce relative deprivation of people and terrorism as a 
result. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) claim that economic growth and equal distribution of income reduce 
poverty, and the rate of poverty alleviation has a crime-reducing effect.
Overall, then, this study suggests that empirical and theoretical analyses should deeply investigate 
the effects of demographic factors on specific societies to understand why terrorism is happening 
in order to defuse the underlying principal causes. Findings of the study here can clarify whenever 
possible, one of the distal causes of terrorism that is the association between growth rate of 
population and lethality of terrorism. However, these conclusions are of course tentative, since we 
know that manifold factors causing terrorism are often not equal over time and space. 
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